Abstract. Alderley Park (Wistar-derived) rats, Rattus norvegicus, were maintained in single-sex groups of eight for 9 weeks under open-room conditions. Both sexes could be categorized into more or less discrete social classes based on the directionality of aggression within dyads. The difference in the number of aggressive acts initiated and received (agonistic score) provided a measure of social pressure for each rat. Males and females differed in the relationship between social class and social pressure and thus in the behavioural and pathophysiological effects of social pressure. Differences in the relationship both between and within sexes can be interpreted in terms of the degree of frustration of different social strategies. The effect of social pressure on behaviour was most obvious in time spent sleeping, exploring and attempts to escape; dominant individuals slept more and low status individuals, especially females, spent more time moving around the enclosure and stretching up the walls. Individual and sex differences in social strategy and time budgeting were reflected in levels of hormone and antibody concentrations during the period of grouping, and in changes in organ histology suggestive of early pathology. Corticosterone (but not testosterone) concentrations correlated significantly with aggressive behaviour, but with aggression subsequent to, rather than preceding or concurrent with, blood samples. Individual differences in aggression initiated and received during introductions did not reflect those recorded in established groups of either sex. The results are discussed in the light of other studies of relationships between social strategy and pathophysiology in rats and the selection pressures likely to be acting on free-living animals leading to a new interpretation of the welfare implications of previous work. 1996 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
Several major difficulties confront the scientific study of animal welfare, among them problems of definition and measurement, a dependence on indirect inference in surmising the subjective experiences of non-human species, and the ability to account for any response that suggests a certain experience in terms of blind procedural rules (McFarland 1989; Kennedy 1992; Broom & Johnson 1993) . Despite these profound obstacles, however, the study of welfare in non-human species is currently a vigorous field of enquiry (see Bateson 1986; Dawkins 1990; Broom & Johnson 1993) . In part this reflects a generally growing concern over the uses and treatment of animals in research, farming, zoos and other forms of management and exploitation; in part it reflects an increasing understanding of the cognitive attributes and psychophysiological responses of non-human species (Griffin 1984; Burghardt 1985; Bohus et al. 1987; Whiten & Byrne 1988; Broom & Johnson 1993; Dawkins 1993) . Both of these trends increase our readiness to give animals the 'benefit of the doubt' as regards a capacity to suffer and thus to experience the negative subjective consequences of impaired welfare. In addition, however, recent functional/evolutionary approaches to welfare have provided frameworks for investigation that purport to avoid some of
